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SUPREMACY WITHOUT PRE-EMPTION? THE VERY SLOWLY
EMERGENT DOCTRINE OF COMMUNITY PRE-EMPTION*
ROBERT SCHÜTZE**
1. Introduction
Legislative competences are potentialities – entitlements for future legisla-
tion – and only in the rare presence of exclusive Community power will they
pose an immediate and direct limit to national powers. Shared competences
will have no such effects. Within shared powers, two legislators are equally
competent to adopt legislation. Here, legislative overlaps exist and the poten-
tial for conflict arises. Where an individual is faced with two competing nor-
mative claims, it has to know which one to follow. For the sake of legal
certainty and substantive justice, normative dilemmas must be avoided. Each
federal legal order opting for shared competences will, therefore, have to de-
termine when conflicts between two legislative spheres exist and how these
conflicts are to be resolved.
For the Community’s shared powers, these two dimensions have indeed
been developed to structure the relationship between European and national
legislation. In Europe’s constitutionalism they have been described as, re-
spectively, the principle of pre-emption and the principle of supremacy: “The
problem of pre-emption consists in determining whether there exists a con-
flict between a national measure and a rule of Community law. The problem
of primacy concerns the manner in which such a conflict, if it is found to ex-
ist, will be resolved.”1 The doctrines of pre-emption and supremacy, so de-
fined, have a remarkably different constitutional character. Pre-emption
analysis and supremacy analysis ought to be distinguished. The difficulty in
keeping the two doctrines apart stems from the dialectical relationship that
exists between them: the doctrine of pre-emption will first determine
whether a conflict between two norms exists – thereby causing the su-
* In honour of Professor M. Waelbroeck.
** Lecturer in Law, Durham University and Durham European Law Institute (DELI). I am
grateful to Professor G. de Búrca for insisting on clarification and helpful advice.
1. M. Waelbroeck, “The emergent doctrine of Community pre-emption – Consent and re-
delegation”, in Sandalow and Stein, Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United
States and Europe, Vol. II (OUP, 1982), pp. 548–580, at 551.
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premacy principle to come into operation. Yet, a prior clarification of what is
the superior norm will be necessary to determine which rule pre-empts the
other. Pre-emption and supremacy thus represent “two sides of the same
coin”.2 They are like Siamese twins: different though inseparable.
In the EC legal order, the supremacy of Community law has long been es-
tablished. In the event of a conflict between Community and national law,
the former will prevail. But when do such legislative conflicts between a
Community and a national norm arise? How supreme is Community law?
Will the national legislators lose their competence once the Community has
exercised its powers – a solution known in German federalism for concurrent
competences – or, alternatively, will the normative conflict be resolved at the
legislative level? How much uniformity will Community legislation impose
on the freedom of national legislators? In order to answer these questions,
this article will investigate the two constitutional principles that structure the
Community’s shared competences: the twin doctrines of supremacy and pre-
emption.
2. The rapidly emergent doctrine of Community supremacy
The resolution of legislative conflicts requires a hierarchy of norms. “Rank-
ing rules are collision rules”.3 Modern federal States typically resolve legis-
lative conflicts between federal and state legislation in favour of the former:
federal law is the supreme law of the land.4 This “centralist solution” has be-
come so engrained in our constitutional mentalities that we tend to forget
that the decentralized solution does not just represent a logical possibility.
On the contrary, for a long time, the “subsidiarity solution” structured the
(con)federal relationship between the government levels of medieval Ger-
many. Its constitutional spirit is best preserved in the old legal proverb:
“Town law breaks county law, county law breaks common law”.5 In the event
2. Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler, “The political organs and the decision-making process
in the United States and the European Community”, in Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler
(Eds.), Integration through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience, Vol.1 (de
Gruyter, 1986), pp. 3–112, at 90.
3. “Rangregeln sind Kollisionsregeln”: Bülow, “Gesetzgebung” in Benda et al. (Eds),
Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2nd ed. (de Gruyter,
1994), pp. 1459 at 1464.
4. Art. VI (2) of the U.S. Constitution, for example, states: “This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.”
5. “Stadtrecht bricht Landrecht, Landrecht bricht gemein Recht.”
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of a legislative conflict, supremacy was thus given to the rule of the smaller
political entity. In modern federal States, this hierarchical solution was in-
verted in order to favour national integration: “The reason for the absolute
supremacy of federal law lay in the fact that the federal state became the
guarantor of national unity. Federal law, therefore, enjoyed an emotional su-
premacy vis-à-vis regional law.”6 This “emotional supremacy” of federal law
continues to dominate the constitutionalism of modern federal States.
The simplest format for a supremacy doctrine is one that is absolute: one
legal order is considered superior to the other. Absolute supremacy may – as
we saw above – be given to the legal system of either the smaller or the big-
ger political community. Between these two extremes lies, however, a range
of possible nuances: a constitutional hierarchy of legislative norms may be
made contingent on the respective legal sources within the two legal systems.
Such a nuanced supremacy doctrine has traditionally structured the hierarchi-
cal relationships between domestic and international law in the German con-
stitutional order.7 Alternatively, the hierarchical relationship between the two
legal orders could be a function of the policy area at stake: federal law could
be supreme for certain competences, while this hierarchical relationship may
be inverted for other policy areas. Not many federal constitutions acknowl-
edge this second type of “subsidiary competence”, whereby in the event of a
conflict between federal and state law, the latter would prevail. This solution
can, however, be found in Canadian federalism.8
The 1957 Rome Treaty did not mention the supremacy of Community law.
Would this mean that, in line with the ordinary canons of international law,
6. Fleiner, Bundesstaatliche und gliedstaatliche Rechtsordnung in ihrem gegenseitigen
Verhältnis im Rechte Deutschlands, Österreichs und der Schweiz, (1929) 6 Veröffentlichungen
der Vereinigung deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer, 2–24 at 3: “durch die Tatsache, daß der
Bundesstaat der Garant der nationalen Einheit wurde, und das Bundesrecht daher gegenüber
der gliedstaatlichen Gesetzgebung gefühlsmäßig als eine Ordnung höheren Ranges erschien.
Hier light die Quelle für die Behauptung von dem unbedingten Vorrang des Bundesrechts im
Bundesstaat”.
7. The status of international law in the German legal order depends on its legal source.
While general principles of international law assume a hierarchical position between the Ger-
man constitution and federal legislation, the transformed or implemented international treaty
has traditionally been placed at the hierarchical rank of normal legislation.
8. Such an inversion of the “centralist” supremacy rule can be found in relation to old age
pensions. Art. 94 A introduced by the 1964 Canadian Constitution Act states: “The Parliament
of Canada may make laws in relation to old age pensions and supplementary benefits, includ-
ing survivors’ and disability benefits irrespective of age, but no such law shall affect the opera-
tion of any law present or future of a provincial legislature in relation to any such matter.” In
the event of a conflict, provincial law will prevail over federal law. The phenomenon of “sub-
sidiary legislation” was also known in Imperial Germany; see Laband, Das Staatsrecht des
Deutschen Reiches, Band 2, 5th Edition (Scientia Verlag, 1964), pp. 117–8.
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the supremacy issue was a matter for the national legal orders? Or, was there
a Community doctrine of supremacy? How supreme would Community law
be over national law? In what way would Community law prevail over con-
flicting national law: would it “break” or “disapply” it? Let us tackle these
questions in two sub-sections. First, let us look at the Community nature and
the scope of the supremacy doctrine. The second sub-section will then inves-
tigate the effect of Community supremacy on conflicting national law.
2.1. How supreme is Community law? The scope of the doctrine of
Community supremacy
The strong dualist traditions of two of the EC Member States in 1958,9 posed
a serious legal and “emotional” threat to the unity of the common market.
The Court reacted. It centralized the issue of supremacy and turned it into a
Community principle. In Costa v. ENEL,10 the European judiciary was asked
whether national legislation adopted after 1958 would prevail over the EC
Treaty. The Italian dualist tradition had treated Community law as ordinary
legislation that could be derogated from by subsequent national legislation.
Would the lex posterior rule apply? Could a Member State unilaterally deter-
mine the status of Community law in its national legal order?
The EC Treaty, the Court pointed out, was not an ordinary international
treaty:
“The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which
derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit
of the Treaty, make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord
precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system
accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity. The executive force of Com-
munity law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subse-
quent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives
of the Treaty set out in [Article 10 (2)]”.11
Community law would reign supreme over national law. The Court,
unsurprisingly, had to derive an “is” from an “ought” to justify the “emo-
tional supremacy” of Community law.
But, how supreme was Community law?12 The fact that the EC Treaty pre-
vailed over national legislation did not automatically imply that all Commu-
9. Sasse, “The Common Market: Between international and municipal law, 75 Yale Law
Journal (1965–6), 696–753.
10. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., [1964] ECR 585.
11. Ibid. at 593–4 (emphasis added).
12. For this excellent question posed in the context of national courts, see Bebr, “How
supreme is Community law in the national courts?” 11 CML Rev. (1974), 3–37.
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nity law would prevail over all national law. There was nothing natural in
having a Commission regulation prevail over national constitutional law.
Would a hierarchical “subsidiarity solution” here solve legislative conflicts
between Community and national law? The Treaty’s silence did not preclude
the “relative” supremacy of Community law and much could be said in
favour or against the normative parity/priority of national constitutional law
in such a situation. The European Court of Justice, however, never accepted
this nuanced supremacy doctrine and quickly moved from “a relative to an
absolute supremacy of the Treaty and secondary Community Law over any
provision of municipal law of whatever nature and kind”.13
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,14 the Court was asked to address
the normative relationship between Community secondary law and national
constitutional law. A German administrative court had argued that “the pri-
macy of supranational law must yield before the principles of the German
Basic law”.15 Should the fundamental structural principles and human rights
of national constitutions be beyond the scope of Community supremacy?
The Court disagreed. Community law “cannot because of its very nature be
overridden by rules of national law, however, framed, without being deprived
of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Com-
munity itself being called into question”. “Therefore the validity of a Com-
munity measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by
allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by
the constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional
structure.”16 The Court’s vision of the supremacy of Community law over na-
tional law was an absolute one: “The whole of Community law prevails over
the whole of national law.”17
13. Ibid. at 4.
14. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für
Getreide und Futtermittel, [1970] ECR 1125.
15. Ibid., para 2.
16. Ibid., para 3.
17. Kovar, “The relationship between Community law and national law”, in EC Commis-
sion (Ed.), Thirty Years of Community Law (EC Commission, 1981), pp. 109–149, at 112–3.
The present article only deals with the hierarchical relationship between Community law and
unilateral national measures. In relation to international treaties concluded by Member States,
the supremacy of Community law took much longer to emerge. For a trajectory of that devel-
opment, see Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of the
Legislative Function in the European Union (EUI Thesis, 2005), Chapter 6.
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2.2. The effect of Community supremacy: Disapplication and not
invalidation
What are the legal consequences of the precedence of Community law over
conflicting national law? Will the supreme effect be automatic or will it de-
pend on an official declaration by the national authorities? Moreover, must a
national court “hold such provisions inapplicable to the extent to which they
are incompatible with Community law” or must it “declare them void”?18
These issues concern the constitutional effect of the supremacy doctrine in
the Community legal order.
The classic answer to these questions is found in Simmenthal II.19 The rul-
ing was a constitutional afterthought to the Court’s first Simmenthal deci-
sion.20 The preliminary question was simply: “[W]hat consequences flow
from the direct applicability of a provision of Community law in the event of
incompatibility with a subsequent legislative provision of a Member
State”?21 The question concerned the supremacy, not the pre-emption of
Community law.22 According to Italian constitutional law, national legisla-
tion could only be repealed by Parliament or the Supreme Court. Would
lower national courts have to apply national laws in the meantime and wait
for the respective national constitutional authorities to give effect to the su-
premacy of Community law? Unsurprisingly, the Court of Justice rejected
such a reading. Appealing to the “very foundations of the Community”, na-
tional courts were under a direct obligation to give immediate effect to Com-
18. This very question was raised in Case 34/67, Firma Gebrüder Luck v. Hauptzollamt
Köln-Rheinau, [1968] ECR 245.
19. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA. But see
already: Case 48/71, Commission v. Italy, [1978] ECR 629.
20. The facts of the first Simmenthal decision (Case 35/76, Simmenthal SpA v. Ministero
delle Finanze, [1976] ECR 1871) are easily restated. Despite the existence of various legisla-
tive acts issued by the Community to give effect to the common organization of the market in
beef and veal, Italian veterinary and health laws still seemed to conduct systematic veterinary
and health inspections for imports. Those health checks were (partly) financed by a system of
charges levied on the importers of the relevant products. Simmenthal, one of the traders af-
fected by the national regulation, brought proceedings against the Italian administrative au-
thority for recovery of the fees charged for inspection, claiming that the national law
constituted an unjustified measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction,
making the imposition of the fees equally unlawful. The ECJ agreed with Simmethal in
Simmenthal I. The focus of the Simmenthal II ruling was how this finding was to be imple-
mented in the national legal order.
21. Case 106/77, Simmenthal, para 13.
22. For an opposing view cf. Cross, “Pre-emption of Member State law in the European
Economic Community: A framework for analysis”, 29 CML Rev. (1992), 447–472 at 449,
seeing Simmenthal as the Court’s “first expression of the basic principle of pre-emption“.
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munity law. The direct applicability of Community law meant that “rules of
Community law must be fully and uniformly applied in all the Member
States from the date of their entry into force and for so long as they continue
in force”.23
But what exactly was to happen with conflicting national provisions?
What did Community supremacy mean? Transposing the doctrine of su-
premacy from German federalism would have put national courts under a
duty to declare conflicting national laws void. The importation of this strong
constitutional solution had been advocated by Grabitz arguing that “Commu-
nity law breaks national law”.24 The legal consequence of a violation of
Community law would, consequently, be the nullity of national law.
The Court of Justice, however, memorably chose a milder alternative and
characterized the constitutional effect of the supremacy of Community law
in the following words:
“[I]n accordance with the principle of precedence of Community law, the
relationship between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable
measures of the institutions on the one hand and the national law of the
Member States on the other is such that those provisions and measures not
only by their entry into force render automatically inapplicable any con-
flicting provision of current national law but – in so far as they are an
integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in the
territory of each of the Member States – also preclude the valid adoption
of new legislative measures to the extent to which they would be incom-
patible with Community provisions”.25
The Court’s preferred supremacy doctrine would not render existing national
measures void, but only “inapplicable” to the extent to which they conflicted
with Community law.26 The effect of the supremacy doctrine appeared, how-
23. Case 106/77, Simmenthal, para 14.
24. This is the very title of Grabitz’s monograph “Gemeinschaftsrecht bricht nationales
Recht” (L. Appel, 1966). The author concluded that “[a]ls Ergebnis der bisherigen Unter-
suchung ist festzuhalten, daß Rechtsfolge des Verstoßes gegen die gemeinschaftlichen Kolli-
sionsnormen die Nichtigkeit des nationalen Rechts ist. Der Satz ‘Gemeinschaftsrecht bricht
Landesrecht’ ist daher als Bestandteil des positiven Gemeinschaftsrechts anzusehen” (Grabitz,
ibid., at 113). This position was shared by Hallstein: “[T]he supremacy of Community law
means essentially two things: its rules take precedence irrespective of the level of the two
orders at which the conflict occurs, and further, Community law not only invalidates previous
national law but also limits subsequent national legislation” (Hallstein quoted in Sasse, op. cit.
supra note 9, 696–753 at 717 (emphasis added)).
25. Case 106/77, Simmenthal, para 17 (emphasis added).
26. The Court’s reference to “directly applicable measures” was not designed to limit the
immediate supremacy of Community law to regulations. The Community measures at issue in
Simmenthal I were, after all, directives. This point was clarified in subsequent jurisprudence:
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ever, stronger in relation to future national legislation: the supremacy of
Community law would “preclude the valid adoption of new legislative mea-
sures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community
provisions.”27 Was this to imply that national legislators were not even com-
petent to adopt national laws that would run counter to existing Community
legislation? Were these national laws void ab initio?
Some authors have indeed advocated the “non-existence” theory and con-
sidered national laws that violated prior Community rules to be void.28 The
very competence of national legislators would thus be pre-empted. This solu-
tion found intellectual inspiration in German federalism, where the exercise
of a concurrent competence by the federal State will constitutionally pre-
empt the competence of the States to adopt legislation on the same subject-
matter.
This competence reading of the doctrine of supremacy goes, however, too
far. In Ministero delle Finanze v. IN.CO.GE.’90 Srl,29 the Commission had
interpreted the second prong of the Simmenthal ruling to mean that “a Mem-
ber State has no power whatever to [subsequently] adopt a fiscal provision
that is incompatible with Community law, with the result that such a provi-
sion … must be treated as non-existent”.30 The European Court of Justice
disagreed with this interpretation. Pointing out that Simmenthal “did not
draw any distinction between pre-existing and subsequently adopted national
law”,31 the incompatibility of subsequently adopted rules of national law
with Community law did not have the effect of rendering these rules non-ex-
istent.32 National courts were only under an obligation to disapply a conflict-
ing provision of national legislation  – be it prior or subsequent to the
coming into force of the Community rule.
The suspension of a conflicting national law is, thereby, the direct and au-
tomatic consequence of the supremacy of Community law. The national leg-
cf. Case 148/78, Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629; and Case 152/
84, M. H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teach-
ing), [1986] ECR 723.
27. Case 106/77, Simmenthal, para 17 (emphasis added).
28. Barav, “Les effets du droit communautaire directement applicable”, 14 CDE (1978),
265–86 at 275–6. See also, Grabitz and Hallstein, op. cit. supra note 24.
29. Joined cases C-10–22/97, Ministero delle Finanze v. IN.CO.GE.’90 Srl and others,
[1998] ECR 6307.
30. Ibid., para 18 (emphasis added).
31. Arguably, the Simmenthal Court did indeed not envisage two different consequences
for the supremacy principle. While para 17 appears to make a distinction depending on whether
national legislation existed or not, the operative part of the judgment referred to both variants.
It stated that a national court should refuse of its own motion to “apply any conflicting provi-
sion of national legislation” (Simmenthal, Case 106/77, dictum).
32. Ibid., paras. 20–21.
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islator will, however, additionally be required to amend or repeal national
provisions that give rise to legal uncertainty.33 This secondary obligation
seems to derive from Article 10 EC.34 The adoption of Community legisla-
tion, however, does not negate the underlying legislative competence of the
Member States.35 The pre-emptive effect of Community law takes place at
the legislative level. It suspends national legislation in conflict with Commu-
nity law. The Community’s non-exclusive competences are, consequently,
shared and not concurrent competences.36
This milder supremacy doctrine has a number of advantages: first, some
national legal orders may not grant their courts the power to invalidate par-
liamentary laws. Second, comprehensive national laws may only be ad-
versely affected by the supremacy of Community law to the extent that they
overlap with EC law: “A national rule, which is set aside for being inconsis-
tent with Community law, is inoperative only to the extent of this inconsis-
33. Case 167/73, Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, [1974]
ECR 359, para 41: “It follows that although the objective legal position is clear, namely that
[Art. 39] and Regulation 1612/68 are directly applicable in the territory of the French Republic,
nevertheless the maintenance in these circumstances of the wording of the Code du Travail
Maritime gives rise to an ambiguous state of affairs by maintaining, as regards those subject to
the law who are concerned, a state of uncertainty as to the possibilities available to them of
relying on Community law.”
The Court now appears generally to assume that the presence of a national provision that
conflicts with Community law will ipso facto “give … rise to an ambiguous state of affairs in
so far as it leaves persons concerned in a state of uncertainty as to the possibilities available to
them relying on Community law”; see Case 104/86, Commission v. Italy, [1988] ECR 1799,
para 12. See also C-185/96, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, [1998] ECR 6601, para 32: “On
that point, suffice it to recall that, according to established case-law, the maintenance of na-
tional legislation which is in itself incompatible with Community law, even if the Member
State concerned acts in accordance with Community law, gives rise to an ambiguous state of
affairs by maintaining, as regards those subject to the law who are concerned, a state of uncer-
tainty as to the possibilities for them of relying on Community law…”
34. See e.g. Case 104/86, Commission v. Italy, [1988] ECR 1799, para 13 and Case 74/86,
Commission v. Germany, [1988] ECR 2139, para 12.
35. In this sense see also Zuleeg, “Vorbehaltene Kompetenzen der Mitgliedstaaten der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiete des Umweltschutzes”, 6 Neue Zeitschrift für
Verwaltungsrecht (1987), 280–286 at 281.
36. The notion of concurrent competence has been predominantly defined in the German
federal order: “Es kennzeichnet den Typus konkurrierender Kompetenz, daß sie den niedrige-
ren Rechtsträgern so lange das Handeln ermöglichen, wie nicht der übergeordnete Kompetenz-
träger von seiner Kompetenz Gebrauch gemacht hat… Das Gebrauchmachen der Kompetenz
löst eine primärrechtliche Sperrwirkung aus. Für die konkurrierende Kompetenz ist insofern
kennzeichnend, daß es nicht der dem Sekundärrecht eingeschriebene Vorranganspruch ist, der
dem Mitgliedstaat die Handlungsfreiheit nimmt, sondern ein unmittelbar im Vertrag angeleg-
ter und durch die Inanspruchnahme der Kompetenz ausgelöste Sperre.” (Nettesheim, Kompe-
tenzen, in von Bogdandy (Ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht: theoretische und dogmatische
Grundzüge (Springer, 2003), pp. 415–477, at 449–50 (emphasis added)).
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tency; the rule may continue to be applied to cases where it is not inconsis-
tent, or to cases which are not covered by the Community norm…”37 Na-
tional rules may continue to be valid in the national legal system.38 They will
remain operable in purely internal situations. Third, once the Community act
is repealed,39 national legislation becomes fully operational again.40
3. The very slowly emergent doctrine of Community pre-emption
The contrast between the prodigious literary presence of the supremacy doc-
trine and the shadowy existence of the doctrine of pre-emption in the Com-
munity law literature is arresting. Libraries have been filled with doctrinal
treatments of the supremacy principle, whereas a contoured doctrine of
Community pre-emption has still not materialized. The very concept of pre-
emption – let alone a doctrine of pre-emption – has remained foreign to the
Community legal order. The concept forms no element in the constitutional
vocabulary of the European Court of Justice and the student of Community
law will have to search hard for general treatments of the pre-emption doc-
trine in the majority of today’s European law textbooks.41 The constitutional
37. De Witte, “Direct effect, supremacy and the nature of the legal order”, in Craig and de
Búrca, The Evolution of EU law (OUP, 1999), pp. 177–213 at 190. The same point had been
made by Zuleeg almost three decades before: “Die einfache Kollisionsregel erlaubt es,
umfassende nationale Gesetze wirksam zu lassen, soweit sie sich nicht mit dem Anwendungs-
bereich des EWG-Rechts überschneiden. … Decken sich die Anwendungsbereiche der
gemeinschaftlichen und der nationalen Regelung, bewirkt die einfache Kollisionsregel eine
bloße Suspension der Anwendung des nationalen Rechts, so daß dieses wieder zur Geltung
kommen kann, wenn das Gemeinschaftsrecht aus irgendeinem Grunde aufgehoben wird.”
Zuleeg, “Die Kompetenzen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften gegenüber den Mitglied-
staaten”, 20 n.F. Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts (1970), 1–64 at 25–7 (emphasis added).
38. The non-application of national laws in these cases is but a mandatory “minimum re-
quirement” set by the Community legal order. A national legal order can, if it so wishes, offer a
stricter remedy to protect the full effectiveness of Community law: Case 34/67, Firma
Gebruder Luck v. Hauptzollamt Koln-Rheinau, [1968] ECR 245, at 251: Although Community
law “has the effect of excluding the application of any national measure incompatible with it,
the article does not restrict the powers of the competent national courts to apply, from among
the various procedures available under national law, those which are appropriate for the pur-
pose of protecting the individual rights conferred by Community law”.
39. Moreover, assuming that the national legislation in conflict with Community law has
not been repealed or amended in the meantime.
40. Zuleeg, op. cit. supra note 37, at 27; and de Witte, op. cit. supra note 37, at 190.
41. The word “pre-emption” hardly occurs in the judicial discourse of the ECJ. In the rare
event that the Court refers to “pre-emption”, it uses the concept in the specific context of Euro-
pean company law to refer to the “right of pre-emption” of a shareholder (cf. Case C-42/95,
Siemens AG v. Henry Noll, [1995] ECR I-6017). Perhaps it is this lack of judicial recognition
that has caused the relative marginalization of the doctrine of pre-emption in the major Com-
munity law textbooks. In-depth discussions of the doctrine of pre-emption in the Community
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terrain of pre-emption remains “one of the most obscure areas of Commu-
nity law”.42
What are the reasons for the shadowy existence of the pre-emption doc-
trine in the Community legal order? Assimilating pre-emption issues to su-
premacy questions has been the cardinal cause for the still under-theorized
nature of the pre-emption phenomenon. Though related, the two doctrines
ought to be kept apart. Supremacy denotes the superior hierarchical status of
the Community legal order over the national legal orders and thus gives
Community law the capacity to pre-empt national law. The doctrine of pre-
emption, on the other hand, denotes the actual degree to which national law
will be set aside by Community legislation. “The supremacy of Community
law does not mean that national law has no place within Community law
dealing with the same subject-matter.”43
The need for a clearer analytical distinction between the two doctrines was
acknowledged early on. Almost thirty years ago, in an insightful article on
the Common Agricultural Policy, Baumann advocated the need to introduce
a pre-emption framework into the Community’s federalism:
“The pre-eminence of Community Law over national law is well estab-
lished. Only a few particular questions are still open to discussion, such
as the relationship between Community Law and national constitutional
law, in particular regarding rights, and the procedure by which the respect
for the pre-eminence of Community Law over national legislation is as-
sured. Consequently, the problem with which lawyers are faced today is
not the pre-eminence problem as such, but the problem of determining the
scope of application of dispositions of Community law with a view to
deciding if in a given situation a conflict between Community law and
national law has arisen.”44
legal order have, however, been undertaken by the following pioneering studies: Weiler, “The
Community system: The dual character of supranationalism”, 1 YEL (1981), 267–306;
Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 548–580; Lenaerts, Le Juge et la Constitution aux États-
unis d’Amérique et dans l’Ordre Juridique Européen (Bruyant, 1988); Cross, op. cit. supra
note 22, 447–472; Weatherill, “Beyond preemption? Shared competence and constitutional
change in the European Community”, in O’Keeffe and Twomey (Eds.), Legal Issues of
the Maastricht Treaty (Wiley Chancery Law, 1994), pp. 13–33; as well as Furrer, Die Sperr-
wirkung des sekundären Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die nationalen Rechtsordnungen: Die
Grenzen des nationalen Gestaltungsspielraums durch sekundärrechtliche Vorgaben unter
besonderer Berücksichtigung des “nationalen Alleingangs” (Nomos, 1994).
42. Cf. Cappelletti, Seccombe & Weiler, “Integration through law: Europe and the Ameri-
can federal experience – A general introduction”, in Cappelletti et al. op. cit. supra note 2, pp.
3–71, at 32.
43. Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Mohr, 1972), p. 287: “Vorrang des Gemein-
schaftsrechts bedeutet nicht, daß nationales Recht bei themenidentischen Regelungen des
Gemeinschaftsrechts keinen Platz mehr hätte.”
44. Baumann, “Common organizations of the market and national law”, 14 CML Rev.
(1977), 303–327, at 303 (emphasis added).
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It is the principle of pre-emption that is concerned with deciding when a
conflict between Community legislation and national legislation has arisen.
The important questions behind the doctrine of pre-emption, therefore, are:
“How much conflict is enough to pre-empt?”45 To what degree will Commu-
nity legislation pre-empt national legislation governing the same subject-
matter? To what extent can the Community and national legislator
co-legislate in parallel? In order to address these issues, we shall first look at
various pre-emption typologies developed for the Community legal order. A
second sub-section will examine the mythical nature of the pre-emption phe-
nomenon as such.
3.1. Pre-emption typologies: The types of legislative conflicts in the
Community legal order
The doctrine of pre-emption is a federal theory of normative conflict. Con-
flicts arise where there is friction between two legal norms.46 The spectrum
of conflict is open-ended and ranges from purely hypothetical frictions to lit-
eral contradictions between norms. There is no easy way to measure norma-
tive conflicts; and, in an attempt to classify degrees of normative conflict,
pre-emption typologies have been developed. Most pre-emption typologies
will, to a great extent, be arbitrary classifications: there simply are no
a priori boundaries between the various degrees of normative conflict. Pre-
emption typologies will, therefore, at best reflect the various judicial reasons
and arguments created to explain why a sub-federal norm conflicts with fed-
eral legislation. Pre-emption frameworks will serve as constitutional devices
for systematizing those species of conflict that have crystallized in a particu-
lar federal legal order. For the Community legal order, each pre-emption type
should, then, correspond to an argumentative topos used by the European
Court of Justice to justify the exclusion of national law as being in violation
of Community legislation.
45. Cross, op. cit. supra note 22, at 465.
46. Normative conflicts have recently been investigated in the context of public interna-
tional law; see Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Re-
lates to other Rules of International Law (CUP, 2003). Pauwelyn’s notion departs from the
classic notion of conflict as physical impossibility to comply with two sets of rules. For the
classic definition of conflict in the international law of treaties, see Jenks, “The conflict of law-
making treaties”, 30 British Yearbook of International Law (1953), 401–453, at 425: “[A] con-
flict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of
different instruments is impossible …. There is no such conflict if the obligations of one instru-
ment are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply
with the obligations of one instruments by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion
accorded by another.”
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3.1.1. A brief constitutional genealogy of the doctrine of Community
pre-emption
The genealogy of the doctrine of Community pre-emption is quickly told. In
the last thirty years, only a limited number of differing conceptions for the
doctrine of Community pre-emption have been suggested.
The first theory reduces the doctrine to instances of field pre-emption. Po-
sitioning the pre-emption phenomenon within his theory of “normative
supranationalism”, Weiler defined the doctrine in the following manner:
“[P]re-emption means that, in relation to fields in which the Community has
policy-making competence, the Member States are not only precluded from
enacting legislation contradictory to Community law (by virtue of the doc-
trine of supremacy) but they are pre-empted from taking any action at all”.47
This definition, while distinguishing between supremacy and pre-emption as
distinct constitutional phenomena, cannot explain why Community legisla-
tion that occupies the field is superior to national legislation. The supremacy
principle is strangely inoperative.
“Supremacy, as we know, provides that once a positive Community mea-
sure already exists any conflicting national norm becomes inapplicable.
Pre-emption precedes this situation in the temporal and (legal) spatial
sense. We are concerned here with a situation where there may not exist
a specific Community measure, but where the entire policy area – the
legal space – has become ‘occupied’, or even potentially occupied, by the
Community in the sense that it is the duty of the Community to fill and
regulate that area. When pre-emption operates, Member States will be
prevented from introducing measures – and hence the temporal dimension
– even in the absence of, or before the adoption of, a specific Community
rule.”48
Pre-emption without supremacy? In separating the two doctrines, this model
must retreat into identifying pre-emption with exclusive competences.49 This
47. Weiler, op. cit. supra note 41, at 277 (emphasis added).
48. Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler, op. cit. supra note 2, at 90 (emphasis added).
49. Approaching pre-emption from its “purest and most extreme form”, Weiler thus identi-
fied the doctrine of pre-emption as a form of exclusive competence. The identification of the
pre-emption phenomenon with exclusive competences emerges at its clearest in Weiler’s 1985
Italian version of his dual supranationalism thesis. “Il sistema comunitario europeo” character-
izes the pre-emption principle as “il principio della competenza esclusiva”: “Nella sua forma
più pura ed estrema, competenza esclusiva significa che relativamente ai campi nei quali la
Comunità ha il potere di indirizzo politico gli Stati membri non solo non possono emanare
leggi in contrasto con il diritto comunitario (in virtù della dottrina del primato) ma nemmeno
possono intraprendere una qualsivoglia attività.” Weiler, Il sistema comunitario europeo:
struttura giuridica e processo politico (Il Mulino, 1985) at p. 61.
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in itself may raise constitutional eyebrows.50 Fatal for this theory’s explana-
tory power, however, is its (self-confessed) misfit with the constitutional re-
ality of the Community legal order. Reducing pre-emption to its purest form
means that for the great majority of federal disputes “the theoretical basis for
exclusivity moves in a gray area between supremacy and pre-emption”.51 A
pre-emption theory that cannot account for this “gray area” is, with all re-
spect, largely self-defeating.
A second conception of the doctrine of Community pre-emption has iden-
tified the doctrine with indirect normative conflicts: “Pre-emption problems
arise in cases where there is no outright conflict between federal (or Commu-
nity) and state law but where a state measure is alleged to be incompatible
with the general policy objectives which federal (or Community) law seeks
to achieve”.52 In the course of a meticulous analysis of pre-emption-like rea-
soning in various policy fields up to the mid-1970s, Waelbroeck famously
documented two approaches to Community pre-emption that surfaced in the
jurisprudence of the European Court.
Weatherill has equally viewed the pre-emption phenomenon in terms of the Community
having “acquired exclusive competence in some sectors” to the effect that “state powers are
pre-empted and the Community has ‘occupied the field’.” “Pre-emption is a question of deter-
mining competence. National action is precluded not because the rules of Community law ap-
ply in the field and prevail in the event of conflict with national provisions, but instead where,
even though there are no Community rules with which national rules can come into conflict,
the national action is impermissible. Pre-emption in this sense logically precedes supremacy.”
Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995), at pp. 136–7
(emphasis added). Pre-emption is, consequently, characterized as “the constitutional re-distri-
bution of competences between the Member States and the Community”; Weatherill, “Pre-
emption, harmonisation and the distribution of competence to regulate the Internal Market”, in
Barnard and Scott, The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart,
2002), pp. 41–74, at 63 (emphasis added).
50. See Schütze, “Parallel external powers in the European Community: From ‘cubist’ per-
spectives towards ‘naturalist’ constitutional principles?” 23 YEL (2004), 225–274, at 260–
265.
51. Weiler, “The external legal relations of non-unitary actors: Mixity and the federal prin-
ciple”, in Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (CUP, 1999), pp. 130–87, at 173. The quote
refers to the ERTA ruling of the ECJ. Weiler claims that in ERTA, “the theoretical basis for
exclusivity moves in a gray area between supremacy and pre-emption”: “If the Court were to
apply a simple principle of supremacy the consequence would be that the Member States would
be precluded from making only those international agreements which were in direct conflict
with the Community obligation. If the Court were to apply fully fledged pre-emption the con-
sequence would be that Member States would be precluded from any international agreement
in the area in question. Instead, the Court stands midway between these two concepts, prohibit-
ing those international obligations which might affect those rules or alter their scope. This is
more than supremacy but less than pre-emption” (ibid.).
52. Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 1, at 550 (emphasis added).
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According to a “conceptualist-federalist approach”, “the Community’s
competence is construed as being necessarily exclusive” and “the essential
problem is to define the scope of the Community competence”.53 National
legislators would be automatically excluded from the legislative field. This
conceptualist-federalist approach could be encountered at the level of pri-
mary and secondary law and thus comprised constitutional and legislative
pre-emption. A second pre-emption type was systematized under the um-
brella name of “pragmatic approach”. Here, the Member States would retain
a “concurrent power to regulate matters falling within the reach of the
Community’s power, as long as in so doing they do not create a conflict with
the rules adopted by the Community”.54 This typology, therefore, envisaged
two types of pre-emption: field pre-emption and obstacle pre-emption. The
model, however, still excluded direct normative conflicts from the scope of
the pre-emption phenomenon.55
A third conception of the doctrine of Community pre-emption has cham-
pioned a “flexible framework for pre-emption analysis” that would “include
all instances of actual and potential conflict between Member State law and
Community legislation.”56 It is the merit of Cross’ study to have drawn first
parallels between the U.S. American doctrine of pre-emption and the emer-
gent doctrine of Community pre-emption. American federalism has over the
last century developed a sophisticated modern pre-emption framework. The
U.S. Supreme Court has summarized the different types of pre-emption in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Devel-
opment Commission in the following manner:
“Congress’ intent to supersede state law altogether may be found from a
scheme of the federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the
interference that Congress left no room to supplement it, because the Act
of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject, or because the object sought to be obtained by
federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the
same purpose.… Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation in a specific area, each state is pre-empted to the extent that it
53. Ibid. at 551.
54. Ibid. (emphasis added).
55. For a similar definitional limitation of the pre-emption doctrine to indirect norm con-
flicts, see Furrer, op .cit. supra note 41, pp. 20–21: “Die pre-emption Lehre untersucht
vielmehr diejenigen Fälle, in denen sich solche gemeinschaftlichen Normen auf nationaler
Ebene handlungsbeschränkend auswirken, was zur Folge hat, daß die Mitgliedstaaten gewisse
Maßnahmen nicht mehr ergreifen können, auch wenn unmittelbar keine primär- oder
sekundärrechtliche Norm entgegensteht.”
56. Cross, op. cit. supra note 41, at 447 (emphasis added).
cola2006051.pmd 7/19/2006, 8:26 AM1037
1038 Schütze CML Rev. 2006
actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when compli-
ance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, …
or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purpose and objectives of Congress.”57
The three identified pre-emption types are, respectively, field pre-emption,
rule pre-emption and obstacle pre-emption.58 Field pre-emption has been de-
fined to refer to situations “where state law is found not to conflict in its ac-
tual operation with the substantive policies underlying the federal
legislation” but where Congress has exercised its “jurisdictional veto”.59 The
second pre-emption type has, somewhat tautologically, been defined as fed-
eral legislation “fairly interpreted” being in “actual conflict” with state law.60
For us, rule pre-emption shall occur where the State law contradicts a federal
rule. The third type of pre-emption has proven much more elusive: State law
will be pre-empted wherever it stands “as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress”.61 Obstacle
pre-emption, so defined, does not represent a very clear normative thresh-
old,62 especially if it is taken to displace “any state legislation which frus-
trates the full effectiveness of federal law”.63
57. Pacific Gas & Electric Co v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), at 203–4 (quotations and references omitted).
58. There is no generally recognized pre-emption terminology in U.S. constitutionalism.
On the contrary, a plethora of “pre-emption frameworks” has developed. We shall choose the
terms field pre-emption, rule pre-emption and obstacle pre-emption, as they arguably reflect
the ideas behind these conflict thresholds the best. This terminology differs from Cross’ analy-
sis that distinguished between “occupation of the field pre-emption”, “direct conflict pre-emp-
tion” and “obstacle conflict pre-emption”. Cross’ terminology suggests a distinction between
occupation of the field pre-emption and conflict pre-emption. The present article, on the other
hand, considers field pre-emption as a form of conflict pre-emption.
59. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. (Foundation Press, 2000), pp. 1204–05.
60. Savage v. Jones, 225 US 501, 533 (1912) (dictum).
61. Pacific Gas & Electric Co v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) at 204.
62. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has given a long commentary on the phrase. It
failed, however, in establishing abstract and clear boundaries around “obstacle pre-emption”:
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973), the Court pre-empted a
state ordinance that “severely” (ibid. 639) impeded the functioning of a federal scheme. In
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), pre-emption was said to require
more than creating an obstacle to mere “general expressions of national policy” (ibid. at 634
(emphasis added)). In a number of cases on the pre-emptive effect of the Sherman Act, the
Court would equally state that state legislation would not be invalidated simply because of
some anti-competitive effect (cf. Fisher v. Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986)). For a discussion of
those cases, see generally Tribe, op. cit supra note 59, at 1179–1195.
63. Perez v. Campbell, 401 US 637 (1971) at 652.
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The modern American pre-emption framework has the advantage of iden-
tifying the pre-emption doctrine with the entire conflict spectrum. It defies
the reduction of pre-emption to the black-and-white mechanism of field pre-
emption and includes indirect as well as direct conflicts within its frame-
work. Field pre-emption itself can – while independent of any actual conflict
– be portrayed as a species of conflict pre-emption.64 The characterization of
the pre-emption doctrine as an “analysis of competing legislation”65 how-
ever, will blind out the phenomenon of constitutional pre-emption.66
Pre-emption so conceived is a legislative phenomenon and represents a rela-
tive doctrine: the question to be asked is not whether Community legislation
pre-empts national law but to what degree is national legislation pre-
empted.67
In the following pages we shall adopt this third pre-emption model. View-
ing the notion of conflict as the underlying rationale of all forms of pre-emp-
tion, the essential differentiating factor between the various types of
pre-emption will be the degree of abstraction of the conflict criterion em-
ployed. From this definitional perspective, “express” and “implied” pre-emp-
tion are not pre-emption types. They solely refer to the mode in which the
Community legislator has expressed its intention to pre-empt and should,
then, be analytically separated from the question to which degree the Com-
munity legislator wished to pre-empt the national level.
3.1.2. Degrees of Conflict in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice
Has the European Court of Justice endorsed a modern pre-emption frame-
work for the Community legal order?68 Has the Court committed itself to a
64. The Supreme Court itself admitted that “field pre-emption may be understood as a spe-
cies of conflict pre-emption: a state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Con-
gress’ intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation” (English v. General
Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990), 79 note 5). In line with the U.S. Supreme Court, Tribe has
seen field pre-emption as “a facet of ordinary pre-emption of conflicting state laws” (Tribe, op.
cit. supra note 59, at 1205).
65. Cross, op. cit. supra note 41, at 453.
66. Theoretically, the pre-emption phenomenon could be envisaged at the level of primary
and secondary Community law. (This is, indeed, the way Waelbroeck viewed pre-emption, op.
cit. supra note 1.) The reduction of the pre-emption doctrine to a legislative phenomenon car-
ries several advantages.  Foremost, as will be seen below, the ECJ has – in parallel with the
U.S. Court – moved to an intent rationale for the doctrine of pre-emption. Pre-emption is thus
conceived of as a legislative phenomenon.
67. In the same sense, Schlösser, Die Sperrwirkung sekundären Gemeinschaftsrechts:
Mitgliedstaatliche Spielräume im “harmonisierten” Umweltrecht (Nomos, 2002), p. 60.
68. The present article will not investigate when and where which types of Community pre-
emption will occur. Sophisticated attempts to explain the jurisprudence of the Court have been
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principled pre-emption statement à la Pacific Gas & Electric Co v. State En-
ergy Resources Conservation & Development Commission? Unfortunately,
the ECJ has not (yet) done so.69 In linguistic alliance with U.S. American
constitutionalism, we shall, therefore, analyse the European Court’s jurispru-
dence through the lens of the three pre-emption types developed in that fed-
eration in descending order – from the most abstract to the most concrete
level of normative conflict.
Firstly, field pre-emption. Field pre-emption will refer to those situations,
where the Court does not investigate any material normative tension, but
simply excludes the Member States on the ground that the Community legis-
lator has exhaustively legislated for the field. This is the most powerful for-
mat of Community pre-emption: any national legislation within the occupied
field is prohibited. The reason for the total exclusion lies in the perceived
fear that any supplementary national action may endanger or interfere with
the strict uniformity of the Community regime. The total prohibition for na-
tional legislators from exercising their shared competences will, thus, to a
certain extent reproduce the effects of a “real” exclusive competence within
the occupied field. Underlying the idea of field pre-emption is a purely ab-
stract conflict criterion: national legislation conflicts with the jurisdictional
objective of the Community legislator to establish an absolutely uniform leg-
islative standard.
In order to illustrate the argumentative structure of field pre-emption let
us take a closer look at the jurisprudence of the European Court in the con-
text of total harmonization under Article 94 EC. In Ratti,70 the ECJ found
that Directive 73/173 pre-empted any national measures falling within its
scope. Member States were therefore “not entitled to maintain, parallel with
the rules laid down by the Directive for imports, different rules for the do-
mestic market”. It was a consequence of the Community system that “a
undertaken in other studies. For the most comprehensive analysis in this repect, see Furrer, Die
Sperrwirkung des sekundären Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die nationalen Rechtsordnungen (No-
mos, 1994). A shorter English version of the argument can be found in Furrer, “The principle of
pre-emption in European Union law”, in Winter (Ed.), Sources and Categories of European
Union Law (Nomos, 1996), pp. 521–540.
69. Cross mentions Case 218/85, Association comite économique agricole régional fruits et
légumes de Bretagne v. A. Le Campion (CERAFEL), [1986] ECR 3513, as a candidate. There
the Court stated that “to ascertain whether and to what extent Regulation 1035/72 precludes the
extension of rules established by producers’ organizations to producers who are not members,
either because the extension of those rules affects a matter with which the common organiza-
tion has dealt exhaustively or because the rules so extended are contrary to the provisions of
Community law or interfere with the proper functioning of the common organization of the
market” (ibid., para 13). The Court has, however, never extrapolated this pre-emption state-
ment from its specific CAP context. Moreover, not even in the agricultural context has
CERAFEL become a standard point of reference in subsequent cases.
70. Case 148/78, Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629.
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Member State may not introduce into its national legislation conditions
which are more restrictive than those laid down in the directive in question,
or which are even more detailed or in any event different”.71 The Community
measure represented an exhaustive set of rules and, thus, totally pre-empted
national legislators.
Similarly strong pre-emption formulations have been used in a number of
agricultural cases. In Apple and Pear Development Council v. K.J. Lewis Ltd
and others,72 the Court inspected the common organization of the market in
fruit and vegetables and found that “an exhaustive system of quality stan-
dards applicable to the products in question” prevented national authorities
from imposing unilateral quality requirements unless the Community legisla-
tion itself provided for such a power.73 In Commission v. Germany,74 the
Court claimed that “it is one of the fundamental characteristics of a common
organization of the market that in the sectors concerned the Member States
can no longer take action through national provisions adopted unilaterally”,
wherever the organization was characterized by comprehensive rules.75
In contrast to field pre-emption, obstacle pre-emption – our second pre-
emption type – requires some material conflict between Community and na-
tional law. Unlike rule pre-emption, however, it refers to a form of
argumentative reasoning that does not base the exclusionary effect of Com-
munity law on the normative friction between a national law and a particular
Community rule. The Court will not go into the details of the Community
scheme, but will be content in finding that the national law somehow inter-
feres with the proper functioning or impedes the objectives of the Commu-
nity legislation. The burden of proof for finding a legislative conflict is,
therefore, still relatively light.
Obstacle pre-emption reasoning can be found in Bussone.76 In the “ab-
sence of express provisions on the compatibility with the organization of the
market established by [the] Regulation … it is necessary to seek the solution
to the question asked in the light of the aims and objectives of the regula-
tions [as such]”. The Court noted that the Regulation did not seek to estab-
lish uniform prices, but that the organization was “based on freedom of
commercial transactions under fair competitive conditions”. “[S]uch a
scheme precludes the adoption of any national rules which may hinder, di-
71. Ibid., paras. 26–27 (emphasis added).
72. Case 222/82, Apple and Pear Development Council v. K.J. Lewis Ltd and others,
[1983] ECR 4083.
73. Ibid., para 23 (emphasis added).
74. Case 48/85, Commission v. Germany, [1986] ECR 2549.
75. Ibid., paras. 12–3.
76. Case 31/78, Francesco Bussone v. Italian Ministry of Agriculture, [1978] ECR 2429.
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rectly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade within the Community …”77
This second pre-emption type can often be found in the agricultural law of
the EC. Here, national legislation is frequently found to violate Community
law not because the Community has established a Common Market Organi-
zation (CMO).78 In the majority of cases, it is not the mere existence of a
CMO that precludes all unilateral action falling within the conceptual scope
of the legislative system established by Community secondary law.79 The
Court employs a functional conflict criterion to oust supplementary national
legislation: those national measures that limit the scope, impede the func-
tioning or jeopardize the aims of a CMO will conflict with Community legis-
lation. While not as abstract and potent as field pre-emption, the virility of
this functional conflict criterion is nonetheless remarkable. Where the Court
selects the “affect” or “obstacle” criterion – be it in the context of EC agri-
cultural law or the Community’s external relations – Community law will po-
tentially widely pre-empt national legislation. Any obstacle that reduces the
effectiveness of the Community system may be seen to be in conflict with
Community law.
The most concrete form of conflict will occur, where national legislation
literally contradicts a specific Community rule. Compliance with both sets of
rules is (physically) impossible. This scenario can be described as rule pre-
emption. The violation of Community legislation by the national measure
follows from its contradicting a Community rule “fairly interpreted”. Put
negatively, where the national law does not contradict a specific Community
provision, it will not be pre-empted.
We can find an illustration of this third type of pre-emption in Gallaher.80
Article 3(3) of Directive 89/622 concerned the labelling of tobacco products
and required that health warnings should cover “at least 4 % of the corre-
sponding surface”. Reading the “at least” qualification as a provision allow-
77. Ibid., paras. 43, 46–7.
78. However, the ECJ may find field pre-emption too. For the standard formulation, see
Case 16/83, Criminal proceedings against Karl Prantl, [1984] ECR 1299, para 13: “[O]nce
rules on the common organization of the market may be regarded as forming a complete sys-
tem, the Member States no longer have competence in that field unless the Community pro-
vides otherwise.”
79. See already Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 1, noting a shift away from conceptual-
federalist to a pragmatic reasoning of the Court. It is therefore problematic to summarize the
agricultural jurisprudence as suggesting that “the modern principle is that the existence of a
common organization precludes unilateral national legislation on the matters which it covers,
unless it can be shown to be incomplete in the sense of not covering or not purporting to cover
the matter at issue.” Usher, EC Agricultural Law (OUP, 2001), p. 156.
80. Case C-11/92, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Gallaher Ltd, Impe-
rial Tobacco Ltd and Rothmans International Tobacco (UK) Ltd, [1993] ECR I-3545.
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ing for stricter national standards, the British government had tightened the
obligation on manufacturers by stipulating that the specific warning ought to
cover 6% of the surfaces on which they are printed. Was this higher national
standard supplementing the Community rule pre-empted and, thus, to be
disapplied?
The European Court did not think so in an answer that contrasts strikingly
with its previous ruling in Ratti. Interpreting Article 3 and 8 of the Directive,
the European Court found that “[t]he expression ‘at least’ contained in both
articles must be interpreted as meaning that, if they consider it necessary,
Member States are at liberty to decide that the indications and warnings are
to cover a greater surface area in view of the level of public awareness of the
health risks associated with tobacco consumption”.81 The Court – applying a
rule pre-emption criterion – allowed the stricter national measure. The na-
tional law did not contradict the Community rule and the national rules were,
thus, not pre-empted by the Community standard.
Finally, a word of caution. It goes without saying that these three pre-emp-
tion types are not watertight concepts. The transition from one type to an-
other is fluid. Firstly, through the application of teleological interpretation
each single Community rule will be interpreted in light of the overall aims
and objectives of the entire Community measure. The distinct normative
thresholds for, respectively, rule pre-emption and obstacle pre-emption be-
come, therefore, more difficult to make out.82 Secondly, even the difference
between rule pre-emption and field pre-emption may be ambivalent.83 The
Court has, sometimes, employed the language of exhaustive legislation with
regard to a single provision found in Community legislation.84 This termino-
81. Ibid., para 20.
82. See, in particular, Case 50–76, Amsterdam Bulb BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewas-
sen, [1977] ECR 137, para 9: “The compatibility with the Community Regulations of the provi-
sions referred to by the national court must be considered in the light not only of the express
provisions of the Regulations but also of their aims and objectives.”
83. Take e.g. Case 60/86, Commission v. United Kingdom (Dim-Dip), [1988] ECR 3921.
Cross views the ECJ ruling as an illustration of “direct conflict pre-emption”: Cross, op. cit.
supra note 41, at 464. Weatherill, on the other hand, treats the decision as a prime illustration of
occupation of the field pre-emption: Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union
(Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 139.
84. See e.g. Case 52/92, Commission v. Portuguese Republic, [1993] ECR 2961, para 19
(emphasis added): “Article 10 of Directive 90/425, which establishes a new system of precau-
tionary measures implemented very rapidly in order to combat effectively the spread of dis-
eases likely to constitute a serious hazard to animals or to human health, brings about the
complete harmonization of the precautionary measures against such diseases and defines pre-
cisely the respective obligations and tasks of the Member States and of the Commission in this
field. The Member States thus have no power, in the area covered by that article and by Deci-
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sion 91/237, adopted in implementation of that article, to take measures other than those ex-
pressly provided for therein.”
85. E.g. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977), 142: “federal pre-emption of
state statutes is, of course, ultimately a question under the Supremacy Clause”.
86. Pre-emption cases “cannot properly be considered constitutional cases” since the
“federal pre-emption question is an alleged conflict between a federal statutory or regulatory
principle and a state law or action.” Hoke, “Transcending conventional supremacy: A recon-
struction of the supremacy clause”, 24 Connecticut Law Review (1991–92), 829–892 at 886.
In light of the erratic identification of pre-emption situations as supremacy cases, the author
therefore advocates “[d]econstitutionalizing pre-emption claims”: Hoke, “Preemption patholo-
gies and civic republican values, 71 Boston University Law Review (1991), 685–766 at 752.
87. Hoke, “Preemption pathologies…” op. cit. supra note 36, at 755.
logical development has introduced the idea of partial field pre-emption of
Community legislation. The “occupied field” in such a case will be defined
by the scope of a particular legislative norm within a Community measure.
Here, both rule pre-emption and field pre-emption may, simultaneously,
serve as possible justification for the existence of a legislative conflict.
3.2. The constitutional phenomenology of pre-emption: Federalizing
statutory interpretation
The pre-emption principle’s dogmatic character has been strangely shrouded
in constitutional mist – even in the U.S. constitutional order. Various theories
have been suggested, the majority of which orbit around the Supremacy
Clause enshrined in Article VI of the American Constitution. While the Su-
preme Court often conceptualizes the pre-emption phenomenon in the con-
text of the supremacy clause,85 the conceptual fusion of the two doctrines
has attracted academic criticism: pre-emption claims are not strictly “consti-
tutional” claims, but legislative claims: the pre-emptive effect does not stem
from the supremacy clause, but arises under the particular piece of federal
legislation.86 The legislative quality of the pre-emption phenomenon has
been underlined by the Supreme Court’s choice of congressional intent as the
“touchstone” of its pre-emption analysis.
The more convincing view, therefore, holds that the doctrines of su-
premacy and pre-emption are linked, but ultimately distinct. The supremacy
clause does not determine “what constitutes a conflict between state and fed-
eral law; it merely serves as a traffic cop, mandating a federal law’s survival
instead of a state law’s.”87 Pre-emption, on the other hand, specifies when
such conflicts have arisen. Briefly again, the pre-emption doctrine deter-
mines what constitutes a conflict, whereas the supremacy clause decides how
that conflict is to be resolved. But if the principles of supremacy and pre-
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88. Cf. Gardbaum, “The nature of pre-emption”, 79 Cornell Law Review (1993–94), 767–
815. “In the American context”, the author claims, “the most common and consequential error
is the belief that Congress’s power of pre-emption is closely and essentially connected to the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution” (ibid. at 768). In order to correct this past error,
Gardbaum proposed the “Necessary and Proper Clause” – the American constitutional equiva-
lent of Art. 308 EC – as the constitutional source for the pre-emption doctrine.
89. Cohen, “Congressional power to define state power to regulate commerce: Consent and
pre-emption”, in Sandalow and Stein (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 1,  at p. 541.
90. Cf. Case 177/78, Pigs and Bacon Commission v. Mc Carren and Company Limited,
[1979] ECR 2161, where the Court had to decide on the compatibility of a levy intended to
subsidize export marketing with, inter alia, Regulation 2759/75 on the common organization
of the market in pigmeat. The Court considered the Community had “intended to ensure the
freedom of trade within the Community by the abolition both of barriers to trade” (ibid., para
14, emphasis added). The Court may even make a reference to the legislative history of a
Community measure, see Commission v. UK (Dim-dip), supra note 83, para 10.
91. For an example of express pre-emption, see Art. 8 of Directive 73/173 on the classifica-
tion, packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations (solvents), O.J. 1973, L 189/7 (dis-
emption are different, where does the pre-emption doctrine come from and
how can this constitutional phenomenon be justified? In the U.S. federal or-
der, one answer has suggested the Necessary and Proper Clause;88 yet, tradi-
tionally, pre-emption is associated with statutory interpretation.
The interpretation of legislative acts in federal systems will, indeed, al-
ways involve a substantive and a federal dimension: “On a substantive policy
level, each [federal] court will have to calibrate the desirable balance be-
tween the competing social values at play in the federal legislation; while, at
the same time, it will impute its global views on what it sees as the appropri-
ate federal equilibrium.”89 In federal orders, statutory interpretation must,
therefore, be seen from the perspective of the horizontal as well as the verti-
cal separation of powers. The pre-emption doctrine provides the analytical
framework within which the historical sensitivities and peculiarities of a par-
ticular federal order are imputed in the interpretative process. The pre-emp-
tion doctrine may, consequently, be conceived of as a federal theory of
interpretation: it assembles those federal values and assumptions that will
guide the federal judiciary in addition to the “ordinary” canons of statutory
interpretation.
Even if the European Court of Justice has yet to clearly announce the
(statutory) interpretation rationale behind the doctrine of Community pre-
emption, its present jurisprudence already points in that direction.90 Express
pre-emption or express saving – to borrow the U.S. American terminology
here once more – are already judicially accepted guidelines for the type of
pre-emption intended by the Community legislator.91 The Community legis-
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cussed in Tullio Ratti, supra note 70) prohibited Member States to “restrict or impede on the
grounds of classification, packaging or labelling the placing on the market of dangerous prepa-
rations which satisfy the requirements of the Directive”. See also, Art. 2(1) of Directive 76/
756, as amended by Directive 83/276, O.J. 1983, L 151/47, (also discussed in Commission v.
UK (Dim-dip), cited supra note 83): “No Member State may: refuse, in respect of a type of
vehicle, to grant EEC type-approval or national type-approval, or refuse or prohibit the sale,
registration, entry into service or use of vehicles, on grounds relating to the installation on the
vehicles of the lighting and light-signalling devices…” A typical express saving clause can be
found in Art. 8 of Directive 85/577 EC on the protection of consumers in respect of contracts
negotiated away from business premises, O.J. 1985, L 372/31: “This Directive shall not pre-
vent Member States from adopting or maintaining more favourable provisions to protect con-
sumers in the field which it covers.” See also Art. 14(2) (a) of Directive 73/241, O.J. 1973, L
228/23: “This directive shall not affect the provisions of national laws: (a) at present
authorising or prohibiting the addition of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter to the chocolate
products defined in Annex I.”
Disagreement exists as to how often the Community legislator expressly speaks its mind.
Contrast Weatherill, op. cit. supra note 83, p. 142: “The legislature does not typically make
explicit the intended pre-emptive scope and effect of the measure.” with Geradin, “Trade and
environmental protection: Community harmonization and national environmental standards”,
13 YEL (1993), 151–199, at 179: “Pre-emption questions are often solved in advance by the
Community legislator, since most directives contain provisions making clear whether their
effect is to deprive Member States of the power to make regulations or if they only impose
minimum standards.”
92. For an analysis of the changing federal philosophies in the EC legal order generally, see
Schütze, op. cit. supra note 17.
lator will, however, not always have expressly spoken its mind about the de-
gree to which national legislation on the same subject-matter is pre-empted.
Implied pre-emption will then give considerable power to the European
Court of Justice to fashion the dominant federal philosophy for the Commu-
nity legal order.92
4. Conclusion: The twin doctrines of supremacy and pre-emption
Supremacy and pre-emption are twin doctrines. There is no supremacy with-
out pre-emption. The doctrine of pre-emption is a theory of legislative con-
flict. The doctrine of supremacy is a theory of conflict resolution. The two
doctrines are vital for any federal legal order with overlapping legislative
spheres. For the Community legal order, the absolute supremacy of EC law
means that all Community law prevails over all national law. The absolute
nature of Community supremacy has, however, not given rise to an absolute
doctrine of Community pre-emption. The scope of pre-emption has been a
relative concept in the Community legal order: the question is not whether
Community legislation pre-empts national law, but to what degree.
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93. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), 395.
94. For a first interesting approximation, see Halberstam, “Of power and responsibility:
The political morality of federal systems”, 90 Virginia Law Review (2004), 731–834.
95. Federal comity has been the reason justifying the supremacy of European law over
So, when will a conflict between Community and national legislation
arise? There is no absolute answer to this question. The Community legisla-
tor and the European Court of Justice will not always attach the same con-
flict criterion to all Community legislation. Sometimes a purely
“jurisdictional” conflict will be enough to pre-empt national law. In other
cases, some material conflict with the Community legislative scheme is nec-
essary. Finally, the Court may insist on a direct conflict with a specific Com-
munity rule. In parallel to U.S. American constitutionalism we consequently
distinguished three pre-emption types within the Community legal order:
field pre-emption, obstacle pre-emption and rule pre-emption.
The constitutional nature of the pre-emption phenomenon was described
as a theory of federal interpretation. The pre-emption doctrine acknowledges
the federal dimension in the interpretation of federal legislation. In federal
orders, the interpretive activity will not only affect the horizontal separation
of powers – the judiciary acting as a quasi-legislator – but also the vertical
separation of powers. Viewing the interpretation of Community legislation as
the “objective” application of the supremacy principle de-federalizes the in-
terpretive process. This reductionist view has been responsible for the very
slow emergence of a sophisticated doctrine of Community pre-emption.
But what is the rationale behind both supremacy and pre-emption? How
can one explain the negative duties imposed on States to disapply, to repeal
or even not to adopt legislation that would conflict with federal law? A
promising constitutional rationale lies in the principle of federal comity. In
the U.S. federal order, the principle’s function has been defined “to help fuse
into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign states”.93 For the
Community legal order, a similar – albeit much more modest – idea is ex-
pressed in Article 10 EC: Member States “shall facilitate the achievement of
the Community’s tasks” by “tak[ing] all appropriate measures, whether gen-
eral or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or from action taken by the institutions of the Community” and by
“abstain[ing] from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the
objectives of this Treaty”.
While the principle of federal comity/fidelity has yet to clearly emerge in
the U.S. American debate,94 it has already surfaced as the principal rationale
behind the twin doctrines of supremacy and pre-emption in the constitution-
alism of the European Community.95 Behind the twin Community doctrines
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national law: “The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in
deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of
the Treaty set out in [Art. 10 (2)]”, Costa v. E.N.E.L., supra note 10, at 594 (emphasis added).
The ECJ has long given Art. 10 EC as the constitutional rationale underlying the twin doctrines
of supremacy and pre-emption. A reference to Art. 10 EC can also be found in Case 22–70,
Commission v. Council (ERTA), [1971] ECR 263, para 21. More recently, the Court has quoted
Art. 10 EC as the source of duties for the Member States in a pre-emption context in the Open
Skies litigation, cf. e.g. Case 476/98, Commission v. Germany (Open Skies), [2002] ECR 9855,
para 137.
of supremacy and pre-emption, thus, stands the very idea of European inte-
gration – an emotional, but excellent reason.
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